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Object 10, 2019, oil on canvas, 4 x (40 x 30cm)
Objects 7, 2020, acrylic on canvas, 2 x (90 x 90cm)
Object 6, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (40 x 30cm)
Object 4, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (30 x 40cm)
Object 12, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (40 x 30cm)
Object 2, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (40 x 30cm)
Object 13, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (40 x 30cm)
Object 5, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (40 x 30cm)
Object 7, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (40 x 30cm)
Object 9, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (40 x 30cm)
Object 14, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (20 x 15cm)
Object 17, 2020, acrylic on canvas, 2 x (29 x 29cm)
Object 15, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (20 x 15cm)
Objects 1, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (60 x 80cm)
Objects 2, 2019, oil on canvas, 6 x (60 x 80cm)
Object 1, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (40 x 30cm)
Object 19, 2020, acrylic on canvas, 2 x (48 x 36cm)
Object 8, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (40 x 30cm)
Objects 4, 2020, acrylic on canvas, 2 x (60 x 80cm)
Objects 5, 2020, acrylic on canvas, 2 x (60 x 80cm)
Objects 6, 2020, acrylic on canvas, 2 x (60 x 80cm)
Object 3, 2019,oil on canvas, 2 x (40 x 30cm)
Object 16, 2020, acrylic on canvas, 4 x (80 x 60cm)
Object 11, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (30 x 40cm)
Objects 3, 2019, oil on canvas, 2 x (60 x 80cm)
Object 18, 2020, acrylic on canvas, 2 x (36 x 48cm)
Still Life Objects - Photographs 

































The gallery is fluid. The paintings are next to each other, further apart, above one 
another, opposite each other, and in separate spaces. The text flows throughout the 
gallery. On occasions it morphs to the shape of the paintings, on others it seeks to 
illustrate the process and the experience of ‘repetition’. In some of the paintings the 
individual canvases can be seen 
at the same time, 
in others there is a delay;
a distance needs to be travelled,                                                memory uncertain. 
6
This research is presented as an exhibition of paintings and text. The 
paintings and writing are symbiotic. The paintings shape the text and the 
text shapes the paintings. Each have informed and questioned each other 
and continue to do so. The text is not intended to explain or describe 
the Object paintings, but to be viewed alongside them, highlighting 
similar themes arising through the writing and artwork of various critics, 
writers, philosophers and artists. Specific attention is paid to a selection 
of artists who use various forms of ‘repetition’ within their paintings: 
Peter Dreher, Bernhard Pifferetti, Cecilia Edefalk, Gillian Carnegie.
7
Painting, Still Life, Repetition 





It is a cat. 
The original is a cat.
It is not a cat. 
It is a painting of a painting. 
We see a cat. 
The repeat is a cat. 
It is a painting. 
They are the same. 
They are different.
10
Written about one of the ‘Object’ paintings in this research, Object 10, the above text 
is indicative of the paradoxical nature of its being, and, to unravel it, is essentially the 
purpose of this study.
Through the act of painting, and repetition as a ‘formula’, to examine what effect 
repetition has on the singular, original subject: the object(s) of a ‘Still Life’. How the 
subject changes or is transferred through the process of repetition and what effect 
this has on the imagery in the resulting artwork. A change from the singular to the 
multiple, from the individual to the collective conscience, from isolation to the collective 
principles of individuation. The original simultaneously destroyed and reaffirmed by the 
‘repeat’. 
To paint it, then destroy it: 
“this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying” 
(Nietzsche, 1968, p. 550).
The original object(s), a thing, a definite, then becomes another thing, a painting. 
That thing, the painting, is then repeated. 
The first painting becomes the subject of the second.
The second is now the subject of the first.
Is the object still the subject? Was the object ever the subject? 
Its imagery remains, but does it still exist within the painting?
As in Magritte’s painting The Treachery of Images (1929), ‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’ or 
Matisse’s apparent retort, “it’s not a woman; it’s a painting” (Fyfe, 2006), is the subject 
still that of the object, the Still Life, or is it now inherent within the paint? In the singular, 
the very negation that it is ‘not a pipe’ and ‘not a woman’ may suggest otherwise, yet 
in its translation to a painting, another ‘thing’, however close an imitation, there is little 
truth to the original object. The only fact would seemingly be its actuality, its ‘being’ as 
a painting, and any supposed imagery, purely fiction. 
And what if repetition is added?
11
I WOULD PREFER NOT TO
So why the repetition?
It is the ‘formula’. 
It is how the paintings are made. It is what they are.
Ah Bartleby! Ah humanity!
12
Throughout Herman Melville’s short story Bartleby the Scrivener, Bartleby repeats his 
response (or variations of): “I would prefer not to” (Melville, 2019). Bartleby is a man 
of unknown history; he lacks any references. His response is neither a refusal nor an 
affirmation of what he would rather do. 
As Giles Deleuze writes in his essay Bartleby; or, The Formula:
The formula is devastating because it eliminates the preferable just as mercilessly as 
any nonpreferred. It not only abolishes the term it refers to, and that it rejects, but 
also abolishes the other term it seemed to preserve, and that becomes impossible 
… All particularity, all reference is abolished. The formula annihilates “copying,” 
the only reference in relation to which something might or might not be preferred 
(Deleuze, 1997, p. 71).
Subjectivity is abandoned, ‘reference abolished’. A painting is just a painting, its 
imagery superficial, it is what it is. And like 
Bartleby has won the right to survive, that is, to remain immobile and upright before 
a blind wall. Pure patient passivity, as Blanchot would say. Being as being, and 
nothing more (Deleuze, 1997, p. 71).
Perhaps? But the ‘formula’ must be applied. And perhaps, it is here, in the process 
itself, that reality lies: in the act of painting, the action of the ‘repeat’. 
The result, the painting, merely the process made visible.
While, there are of course many precedents to the use of the repeated image in art, 
this study is not an analysis or comment on the proliferation or mass production, either 
mechanical or digital, of the image. It is not about the imagery of the image, but its 
‘subject’ objectivity. It is an exploration of what happens to it through repetition, to 
question the truth of its singularity, and to understand its ‘being’ as both present and 
absent within the reality of artwork.









All the Object paintings are made using a process of repetition, and within each 
artwork, the individual parts follow similarities of composition and colour. They are re-
presented, rather than reproduced; there is no real intent to copy the first painting, but 
similar proportions, colours and gestures are adhered to. While there is a sizable nod 
to the first painting, the second is equally independent as an individual part (its marks 
and colours relating to each other within the canvas confines), yet, simultaneously it is 
dependent on the first painting for its very existence, it is inextricably linked.
A painting is made from an object, or more particularly, a photograph of the object. 
A photograph of a reproduction of an idealized form, that is in itself a reproduction. 
The photographs act as instigators for defining a set of limits or rules that distinguish 
between the separate artworks; colours and shapes outline what the painting will 
become. The subject is already distanced from the painting, a pictorial content is 
readymade, and any illusionistic tendency to portray the objects three dimensions is 
diminished. 
A second painting is then made from the first painting. The second painting uses the 
first painting as its subject. It is not a repetition, rather a new event that seeks to repeat 
the first event; an act of painting repeated. 
The first painting is to some extent expressionistic, a series of marks, colour and 
texture made from the photograph of the still life. It is the first creation of an event that 
subsequent paintings will follow. The limits are now set. The original still life is already 
receding. Talking about his own repeated paintings, Pifferetti said: 
The first half of the painting is worked on until it attains a sufficient pictorial content. 
It is already the memory of what will be produced on the other half of the canvas. 
Subjectivity has already been strangled (Fyfe, 2006).
The Object paintings are all fairly ‘figurative’ or ‘representational’, with perhaps only 
Objects 4 veering towards any kind of abstraction. This seemed necessary in order to 





The first painting is a depiction of an object(s), 
the second is a depiction of a painting. 
The first painting has now become the object of the next painting, and the next the 
object of the next. 
The subject is transferred. 
The imagery remains.
The more the images are repeated, the more differences emerge. Rather than devaluing
and diluting the original, the repetitive process highlights the uniqueness and 
authenticity of each individual canvas. It is not so much about repeating an artwork but 
rather through repetition the artwork emerges.
There is an accumulation of experience. The resulting artwork stands as a testament 
to these experiences; the image shifts, colours differ and merge uniquely within each 
canvas. The very fact of repeating makes the ‘repeat’ different to the original: 
that which is repeated has been – otherwise it would not be repeated – but the very 
fact that it has been makes the repetition something new (Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 
149).
Each individual painting is on a separate canvas of equal size, and as such this process 
could continue ad infinitum but for: determined limits, time, material deficiency, or 
human fallibility. In theory, another painting can always be added. This would change 
were the repetitions to be confined within a single canvas. 
19
There are a number of variables.
Most of the still lifes paintings were ‘repeated’ once. 
Some are repeated more than once.
The timescale between the ‘repeats’ differs within the separate artworks.
The time taken to complete each individual canvas is variable, especially 
in relation to the first and second canvases within each painting. 
No timescale limits were predetermined.
There is a change in scale. 
Most are single motif still lifes.
Some have multiple objects within the still lifes. 




 Things to Consider
the effect repetition has on the singular, original subject: the object(s) of a Still Life
the status of hierarchical subject matter, and its importance or irrelevance in both the 
singular and the ‘repeated’ paintings
how the subject changes, or is transferred through the process of repetition
what effect this has on the imagery in the resulting artwork
the inevitable failure of repetition
originality, imitation and appropriation
how the act of painting and its subsequent materiality as an object, affects notions of 
‘representation’ and ‘abstraction’
time, experience, memory and temporality in both the making and reception of the 
painting
the process as the subject
the painting as a relational object
the translation of the painting to an image through digital reproduction
22
Titles
The single motif paintings are titled as ‘Object 1’, ‘Object 2’ etc. 
They are numbered in chronological order. 
Where there is more than one motif, they are titled as ‘Objects 1’, ‘Objects 2’ etc. 
Collectively they are referred to as the ‘Object’ paintings.
Within this exhibition, which largely questions the validity of the original subject, even 
to doubt its existence within the painting, it seemed appropriate to avoid any direct 
reference to what they resemble, for there is little to be gained from labels such as: 
‘Cat’, ‘Horse’ or ‘Woman in a flouncy dress holding a parasol’. 
As soon as it is seen as a describable picture, justifiable in the light of a title, the 
work of the painter has lost its true subject (Gilson, 2020, p. 137). 
If the representation is questioned within the painting, 
then it should equally be addressed to the object.
The titles of “Object” or “Objects”, where chosen to give an unprejudiced openness to 
this study, while also providing a direct reference to the original subjects ‘thingness’ 
and objectivity.
It remains to be seen whether they stay that way, for, if indeed the ‘object’ is dead 







In reality as such, there is no repetition. This is not because everything is 
different, not at all. If everything in the world were completely identical, in 
reality there would be no repetition, because reality is only in the moment
(Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 275).
Within this context ‘repetition’ must be treated as an abstract notion. As Kierkegaard 
points out, ‘there is no repetition … because reality is only in the moment’, if a repeat 
was truly possible, we would have no memory of it. And it is this paradox that drives 
much of this research; repetition cannot exist without difference, and yet, there is no 
signifier of difference without repetition.
The paintings do not seek to define repetition, but to use it as a tool for interrogation. 
Repetition as a process, rather than a definition; to question through repetition, not to 
question repetition. However, an understanding as to what is meant by repetition, and 
fundamentally its failure, is examined necessarily.
26
Similarity and Difference
Integral within the process is the assumption that no two things can ever be the same, 
however similar. Even the simplest of objects or the most tedious of actions has infinite 
and perpetually changing possibilities forced upon it: 
Yet, in isolation the individual has no meaning, for without reference or comparison 
there is no means of evaluation. The repetitive process perhaps provides such a 
basis for evaluation. As the vagaries of ‘likeness’ and realities of ‘difference’ become 
apparent, so too does the importance of the individual part and its relationship to the 
whole. While similarities may satisfy a need for order, and offer an overall picture, they 
lead to generalisation and gross misunderstanding. In closer observation differences 
emerge and such limitations are ultimately challenged.
The conclusions that we seek to draw from the likeness of 
events are unreliable, because events are always unlike.
Resemblance does not make things as much alike as 
difference makes them dissimilar 




In Kierkegaard’s Repetition, Constantin Constantius 
seeks to understand his own meaningful existence 
through repetition and recollection: “If one does not 
have the category of recollection or of repetition, 
all life dissolves into an empty, meaningless noise” 
(Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 149). Deeming recollection 
to be merely an attempt to re-experience a past 
moment in the present, Constantin turns to 
repetition, for he wants the moment to be in the 
present. 
Repetition and recollection are the same 
motion, except in opposite directions, for what 
is recollected has been, is repeated backward, 
whereas genuine repetition is recollected 
forward (Kierkegaard 1983, p. 131).
He wants to experience it as he did before, 
immediately, and in this very moment in time; not 
as something new, but as it was.
Indeed, what would life be if there were no 
repetition? Who could want to be a tablet 
on which time writes something new every 
instant or to be a memorial volume of the past? 
(Kierkegaard 1983, pp.132-133).
Determined to relive experiences he had some 
months earlier, Constantin sets off on a return trip 
to Berlin. He books into the same apartment, walks 
the same streets, visits the same theatre, and 
frequents the same cafés and restaurants. 
But all is not well. 
Experience and Memory
29
 “No matter how I turned and shifted, all was futile.” 
The prized coffee 
“was just as good as last time; one would almost expect it to be, but it was not to my liking. ” 
The restaurant he had frequented every evening on his previous trip 
“and, no doubt by force of habit, had even found satisfactory”, 
was so dull and predictable as to be 
“absolutely the same — in short, the same sameness.” 
The beautiful tree lined street of Unter den Linden was 
“unbearably dusty”. 
The little dancer, previously so graceful 
“on the verge of a leap” 
had already leapt. The blind man’s coat had changed 
from an appealing light green to mixed grey. 
Even the Beadle’s nose had turned pallid.
Disappointed, 
30
“The only repetition was the impossibility of a repetition.” 
(Kierkegaard 1983, all from, pp. 170-171).
In trying to relive his experiences, Constantin, unable to reproduce his past, gets 
caught in his own paradox:
When this had repeated itself several days, I became so furious, so weary of the 
repetition, that I decided to return home. My discovery was not significant, and 
yet it was curious, for I had discovered that there simply is no repetition and had 
verified it by having it repeated in every possible way (Kierkegaard 1983, p. 171).
When this had repeated itself several days, I became so furious, so weary of the 
repetition, that I decided to return home. My discovery was not significant, and 
yet it was curious, for I had discovered that there simply is no repetition and had 
verified it by having it repeated in every possible way (Kierkegaard 1983, p. 171).
His failure is humanity’s gain, confirming his existence and reality of being, where all 
experiences are new, built by previous experiences, moments and memories. Had 
Constantin achieved his repetition he would have no memory of it, he would just be in 
another moment. Lacking temporality, there would be no past, present or future. Stuck 
in a Nietzschean world of the eternal recurrence, he would exist in singularity, devoid of 






Questions of originality and authenticity lie at the heart of the ‘copy’, yet, it is not 
only the impossibility of repetition but also the newness of materials and the failure 
of the artist’s hand to faithfully copy that inevitably leads to the new. However similar, 
or dependent on the original, a painting cannot be reproduced. By purely physical 
reasoning:
Since they are two in number, the material out of which one of them is made cannot 
be the material included in the other one (Gilson, 2020, p. 58).
It may be imitated, but even still, the ‘copy’ must now assume its own independent 
state of being. Whether a fake, imitation, or an honest appropriation, it is made of 
different materials, and evidently, due to its intention, at a different moment in time to 
the ‘original’; either way it exists, as well as, and alongside the original.
Gilson goes on to describe that even with the most ardent copyist, there would be 
a difference in the quality of canvas, differing colours, the use of different brushes, 
and even if this proved indiscernible, he would not be using the same hand. So, what 
then of the artist reproducing his own work, well, this would just be another original. 
If authenticity is ascribed to the artist, then no matter how little they deviate from the 
original, the next painting is neither a repeat nor a copy but as something new, equally 
as truthful as the original. Any question of imitation is made redundant. As artist 
Bernard Pifferetti explains in an interview with Joe Fyfe in 2006, 
Every painting crystallizes a survival and a rupture. It clearly says that the image is 
not imitation. The image is the difference made visible (Fyfe, 2006).
There are many cases of misappropriation, plagiarism, or straightforward fakery within 
art. When arrested in 1945, art forger Van Meegeren, accused of treason for selling a 
Vermeer to the Nazis, admitted to his forgery. Disbelieved by the Dutch authorities, he 
was asked to paint a copy: 
“A copy,” Van Meegeren is reported to have exclaimed, “I’ll do better than that. Give 
me the materials and I will paint another Vermeer before witnesses” (Hogenboom, 
2012).
Not to get side-tracked, but the point being that while he was certainly deceitful, he 
had not painted a Vermeer in the first place. He may well have wished to pass off his 
imitation as a Vermeer, but what he has painted is a Van Meegeren. They are both 
authentic, though only one an authentic Vermeer. 
Heidegger takes this further in his question and title of his book What is a Thing?, 
disregarding the importance of the materiality and placing the emphasis on “place and 
time point”:
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The fact, one could say, that we cannot distinguish between the two exactly alike things 
does not prove that, in the end, they are not different. However, even assuming that 
two single things are simply alike, each is still this thing because each of these two pine 
needles is in another place; and if they are to occupy the same place, they can do so 
only at a different time point. Place and time point make even absolutely alike things be 
these very ones (je diesen), i.e., different ones. Insofar as each thing has its place, its time, 
and its time duration, there are never two same things (Heidegger, 1967, pp. 15-16). 







The objects of the still lifes were largely 
bought from local charity shops. They are 
mass produced low value objects, mainly 
ceramic figurines. It is not the aim to 
relate any story to these objects and any 
cultural or social importance is irrelevant 
to this study. They exist, for this purpose, 
only as objects. As the original subject 
and as things to paint. As Etienne Gilson 
observes in Painting and Reality:
If, by the word “subject” we mean the 
description of some scene or some 
action, then it can rightly be said that a still 
life has no subject … The things a still life 
represents exercise only one single act, 
but it is the simplest and most primitive of 
all acts, namely, to be (Gilson, 2020, p. 24).
Perfect for this study, yet, to pretend that 
the objects hold no significance would be 
disingenuous. It may not be necessary 
to go into the specific detail of the 
object(s) subjectivity, but it is necessary 
to understand it as being present, if only 
to evaluate its continuing presence or 
absence within the painting. In his four 
essays in Looking at the Overlooked 
(1990), Norman Bryson gives a more 
substantive viewpoint. For while, Still life 
as a genre, is often overlooked and seen 
historically as of a lower order “at the 
bottom of the hierarchy, unworthy of the 
kind of superior attention reserved for 
history painting or the grande maniere” 
(Bryson, 1990, p. 8), it is its lowliness that 
is also its strength.
             
Often seen to be an expression of 
abundance, wealth and possession, 
especially within the Dutch Still Lifes of 
the 17th Century, and as Barthes refers 
to, the “matter’s most superficial quality, 
sheen” (Bathes, 1972, p. 5), still lifes have 
equally dealt within the lower orders 
of everyday existence. Of the ‘kitchen’ 
still life paintings of Juan Sanchez 
Cotan, Bryson sees “as exercises in 
the renunciation of normal human 
priorities” (Bryson, 1990, p. 63). Drawing 
a distinction between the grandiose 
‘megalography’ of historical or allegorical 
paintings, and Cotan’s ‘rhopography’ 
paintings, that which deal with the low 
value, mundane and trivial, Bryson points 
to a world where traditional values are 
overturned:
Cotan makes it the mission of his 
paintings to reverse this worldly 
mode of seeing by taking what is of 
least importance in the world – the 
disregarded contents of a larder – 
and by lavishing there the kind of 
attention normally reserved for what 
is of supreme value (Bryson, 1990, 
p. 64).
As Bryson explains, the two categories, 
‘megalography’ and ‘rhopography’, are 
naturally ‘intertwined’. In order for there 
to be something of high importance 
there must be something of less 
importance. The cheap, trivial, mundane 
and everyday, must coexist with the 
expensive, important and unique. There 
is a hierarchy, but this is open to change, 
and only something society can evaluate. 
Trends and fashion are nothing new, 
values forever differ. This is not a modern 
trait: Cotan’s still lifes were painted 




One of still lifes main detractors was Joshua Reynolds, himself a 
strong advocate for the ‘Grand Manner’, whereby art should seek 
to embellish nature to create idealised forms of the imperfect; not, 
as he criticised to slavishly copy it. In his Discourses (1769-1790), a 
series of lectures delivered at the Royal Academy, Reynolds largely 
denounces still life painting as closer to craft than art; that it is 
mechanical, lacking in thought and concerned mainly with imitation: 
“a mere matter of ornament; and the painter has but the humble 
province of furnishing our apartments with elegance” (Bryson, 1990, 
p. 175). Faint praise indeed, but he does offer some solace:
Even the painter of still life, whose highest ambition is to give 
a minute representation of every part of those low objects 
which he sets before him, deserves praise in proportion to his 
attainment; because no part of his excellent art, so much the 
ornament of polished life, is destitute of value and use (Bryson, 
1990, p. 175).    
Over obsessed with detail, realism, hyper-realism and trompe l’oeil; 
Reynolds has a point.
If the objective is only to imitate, to copy, where is the art? Yet, were 
it just a matter of style, it remains unlikely that Reynolds would have 
been any more appreciative of still life painters such as, Morandi, 
Corbet, Manet or Soutine, who moved away from such ‘minute 
representation’; nor the differing approaches of contemporary 
painters: Gillian Carnegie, Jenny Packer, or Katherine Bernhardt. No 
expression or intensity could ever elevate ‘those low objects’ to be 
equal to any within his grand manner. 
If the still life has ‘no subject’ then the painting is also lacking in 
the ‘general ideas’ Reynolds considered essential to great art; the 
greatness of the painting directly proportionate to the hierarchical 
importance of the subject. If flower paintings were nothing without 
colour: “these petty excellencies (of colour) are here the essential 
beauties; and without their merit the artist’s work will be more short 
lived than the object of his imitation” (Bryson, 1990, p. 176), it can 
be assumed that colour is their only importance. Far from being 
mere ‘imitation’, Reynolds appears to have unearthed arts’ first 
instances of abstraction and acts of pure painting. The flip side 
being, if we place greater importance on the subjectivity, can the 
paintings ever lose their reliance on it. Are they always ‘about’ and 
never ‘it’? 
40




In our era of the post-postmodern or altermodern 
(Bourriaud), unlike Reynolds, we have little problem 
placing the oblique or understated on equal footing 
as the grand gesture, yet, one of still lifes greatest 
reprovals still exists: that it largely fails to address 
the importance of the human plight. We, as humans, 
are not in it, and as a genre it: “negates the whole 
process of constructing and asserting human beings 
as the primary focus of depiction” (Bryson, 1990, p. 
60).
If the aim or subject of the painting is to narrate a 
story, once read, we need to look further to the story 
and not the painting. If there is no story, we need to 
look at the painting. As Bryson puts it: 
the whole principle of story telling is jeopardised 
or paralysed by the hearer’s objection: ‘so what?’ 
But still life loves the ‘so what?’ (Bryson, 1990, 
p. 60).
          
The still life, while seemingly more particular, a 
straight-forward depiction of what is on the ‘table’, is 
possibly more intriguing for its lack of story. Closer 
to abstraction, and ultimately less particular to the 
painting. Yet, for all their colour, from the Dutch Still 
Lifes to the violent explosive animation of Soutine, 
the muted palette of Morandi and Carnegie, or 
the vibrancy and emotion of Packer and the neon 
of Bernhardt, still life paintings are far from ‘petty 
excellencies’. As I found out in my search for the 
mundane, inconsequential object, everything has 
baggage. There isn’t an object devoid of cultural 
reference; from possessions of wealth to inane 
mass-produced tat, objects merely produced to 
be consumed, once deemed necessary but now 
discarded, everything has a tale to tell. 
The cheap equally important as the expensive, the 
everyday objects of use or the ultimate vanity of 
desire -  they speak of us.
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Most notably known for her intimate portraits of friends and family, Jenny Packer instils 
the same level of political intensity into her flower paintings. Painted from life, and in 
reaction to institutional violence against black Americans, she has described her flower 
compositions as ‘funerary bouquets’ and ‘vessels of personal grief’. In Say Her Name, 
(2017), a painting made in memoriam to Sandra Bland, a Black American believed to 
have been murdered while in police custody, Packer puts ‘us’ very much centre stage:
The bouquets like ‘Say Her Name’ highlighted something that’s been true in my 
practice overall, which is this appreciation for observation and also understanding 
the emotional resonance of the things, the spaces in which we exist and around the 
people that we care about, whether we know them or not (Westall, 2020).
 
It may be ‘merely’ a flower still life, but as she is reported to have questioned in 
response to seeing Henri Fantin-Latours flower paintings: “How can a painting 
of a bouquet feel more compelling than a painting of a person? How do I feel the 
humanness of a thing?” (Manlaykhaf & McVeigh, 2020).
In contrast, Katherine Bernhardt’s paintings would appear to highlight “a light-hearted 
interpretation of banal or everyday subject matter” (Melic & Morrill, 2019, p. 30). Objects 
of ‘daily life’, fast food, cigarettes, basketballs, headphones, watermelons, Sharpies, 
bananas, trainers and socks. All jumbled together in what she describes as her ‘pattern 
paintings’; our consumer world shoved before us in large scale neon paintings, the 
repeated imagery indicative of our own profligacy. We are in it. 
Rosalind Krauss points to Fredric Jameson characterisation of ‘postmodernity as 
the total saturation of cultural space by the image’, a saturation in which “aesthetic 
experience is now everywhere, in an expansion of culture that has not only made the 
notion of an individual work of art wholly problematic, but has also emptied out the 
very concept of aesthetic autonomy.” In what Jameson refers to as ‘a postmodern 
sensation’: “everything is now fully translated into the visible and the culturally familiar” 
(Krauss, 2000, p. 56).
Rather than being just an object to paint, I have stumbled into a genre hell bent on 
cultural reference and one that speaks of our very existence. Devoid of a particular 
story, one that: “finds the truth of human life in those things which greatness overlooks, 
the ordinariness of daily routine and the anonymous, creatural life of the table” (Bryson, 
1990, p. 178).
So, can such imagery be ignored, and what of our expanded culture that makes ‘the 







All, bar two of the paintings, are painted onto 
a traditional substrate of wooden stretcher and 
canvas. Object 14 & 15 are painted onto aluminium 
plates. There is no particular importance placed 
on the type of substrate other than to explain their 
make-up as objects in themselves. Object 1-15 
and Objects 1-3 are painted in oils, all subsequent 
paintings were acrylic. While, there was no 
particular reason for this change, other than a 
personal choice, there were significant differences 
when it came to painting the ‘repeat’. 
All, bar one of the paintings were completed in 
sequence, one after another. Within each painting 
the first canvas setting the parameters that the rest 
will follow. Each individual canvas marking a period 
of time and labour unique to itself. There were 
no time limits set and each canvas was worked 
on until it reached a conclusion: essentially a 
satisfactory state of likeness to the previous. Most 
of the canvases within any of the paintings 
were finished in one sitting. The length of the sitting 
varied, determined by the time taken to complete 
the canvas. In some instances, mainly with the 
larger Objects paintings the ‘sitting’ would stretch 
to the next day. Invariably, the repeat in all cases 
took longer than the painting of the first. There is 
an increased amount of time and concentration 
required to mix similar colours, and to execute 
similar marks. There are measurements, and a 
necessary order of marks that need to be followed. 
There is memory to overcome, and there is fatigue. 
The first canvas is free of any such restrictions;





Where there are two canvases, this fundamental difference in the way they are painted 
is more keenly felt. With increased repeats the act of painting becomes somewhat 
less intense. The repeat of the repeat is painted under similar conditions, it comes 
under less scrutiny, and with experience a sense of understanding and learning is 
implemented. 
The first repeat is always the hardest.
There were some advantages (mainly in the mixing of paint) and gone was the sense 
of the methodical repeat. There are artists who have worked very successfully in this 
simultaneous fashion, most notably: Robert Rauschenberg in the making of Factum I 
and Factum II (1957), or Cecilia Edefalk, who often uses repetition in her paintings, in In 
the painting the painting (1995-1996). Yet, it felt somehow unconvincing, and ultimately 
a very unnatural way to work. I may return to it, but for now Object 17 is the only 
painting completed in this way.
Working in sequence there is more of 
a sense of a painting repeated,
more distinguishable moments in time, 
one after another.  
When painted simultaneously, as in 
Object 17, there is no first and last, 
and consequently the moment and 
labour time is equally shared. The 
result is very similar, but the process: 







In the individually painted canvases, the colours were 
mixed afresh within each repeat. This was not such 
a dilemma when using oils, as the colour differs only 
slightly from wet to dry. In fact, due to the extended 
drying time most were still wet at the time of the 
repeat. However, when switching to acrylics there was 
a noticeable difference between the wet and the dried 
colour, and allowances had to be made to counteract 
the difference. 
While there is no intention within the Object paintings 
to create an exact copy, and differences are naturally 
welcomed, Etienne Gilson recounts an example which 
highlights this material understanding. Amaury-Duval, 
a pupil of Ingres, creates a copy of Ingres portrait of M. 
Bertin. He does so with Ingres’s blessing and succeeds 
to such a degree that on examining the recently finished 
copy: “Ingres simply concluded: “I would willingly sign 
it.” The problem for Amaury-Duval comes some years 
later, when revisiting his work. He finds that his version 
has darkened, and when painting the copy, had failed 
to consider any darkening of the paint that had already 
taken place in Ingres’s original (Gilson, 2020, p. 60).
Within the Object paintings the period between each 
painted canvas is not sufficient to expect any noticeable 
difference in aging. They will age together, that is, if their 
material make-up is similar. This is probably most true 
of the acrylic paintings, and despite the initial problem 
of the change in colour as the paint dries, they are 
essentially more stable. Without getting too scientific, 
the acrylic paint dries by vaporization, a relatively fast 
process, and once dry there is little change in their 
consistency. The oil paints, however, will continue to 
‘dry’ as the oil within the paint oxidises and hardens, 
and are less predictable. Essentially, they continue to 
change, and under relatively normal indoor settings are 
more likely to crack or yellow (Jones, 2004). How this 
affects the Object paintings, only time will tell, and any 
incidental cracking or yellowing only serves to highlight 






Most repeats were painted the following day. Where there is a longer period between 
the repeat, it is only a matter of days. The only exception to this was Objects 1. The 
second painting was completed two months later. This was partly circumstance, but 
also an uncertainty about the painting itself. It was only after the first two paintings 
of Objects 2 were completed that I returned to Objects 1. Perhaps, still unsure about 
the painting, I decided to repeat it anyway. Logic suggested that it was the repeat 
that was necessary, and any judgement as to whether I was ‘happy’ with the original 
largely irrelevant. This slight irreverence had come about in the painting of Objects 2 
and was a move away from the now seemingly rigid ‘formula’ of the single motif Object 
paintings. 
In Objects 2, the first painting was never really resolved into what was, at the time, 
considered a satisfactory state. At the end of painting on the first day the top right-
hand corner was scraped away, with the intention that it was completed on returning. 
However, that is how it stayed, there was nothing else I wanted to add, and it was to be 
repeated in the same way. The limits had been set, whether complete or not, and at the 
end of the second day I scraped away the top right-hand corner of the second canvas. 
This process continued each day until the six canvases, and indeed the whole, was 
complete. Slightly more naively painted, it highlighted the ‘repeat’ as a moment in time, 
the process and act of painting, rather than just the repeated object. In some ways, it 
acted as a release, and the following Object paintings, Object 16-19 and Objects 3-7, 




The Painting as a Whole
 
While each Object painting is made through a repetitive process, repeating its 
individual parts, it must also be seen as a whole. Whether the number of ‘repeated 
paintings is two, four or six, each individual canvas is only part of the whole artwork. 
There is always going to be a repeat, with one being the least possible for the artwork 
to exist. The first canvas is only a part of the painting; the second canvas is not so 
much a repeat of the first but rather the second half of the whole. Equally, if there are 
four canvases, each makes up a quarter of the artwork. The final artwork is not four 
times one (though this is how the artwork comes into being), but a whole of four parts:
 
4/4 as opposed to 1x4 or 1+1+1+1
The number of repetitions is not always predetermined. Yet, whether, a conscious 
decision or out of circumstance, the number of repetitions is finite to the artwork (the 
whole painting). While each canvas is a ‘finished’ individual painting in itself, it does not 
exist as an artwork in isolation, only in combination do they constitute ‘the painting’.
As individual canvases, in theory there could always be another repeat, they could 
continue ad infinitum. This would, however, create a series of ongoing individual 
paintings, or perhaps an ever changing whole. The painting would never be complete, 
or indeed completed. This is perhaps a moot point, as we can only view what is 
presented to us. An unfinished painting is no longer an unfinished painting when 
viewed. It is a totality; it is what it is. It is no more unfinished as a painting, as a finished 
painting is finished. If another canvas is added, or indeed taken away, the painting is 
only what we are confronted with. Other repetitions may exist, but if we are not aware 
of them, they do not exist as part of the painting experienced. If we are made aware of 
them, it becomes what we can see plus the knowledge of more. The painting changes 
from ‘what we see’, ‘to what we see, plus imagined others’.
Within this process there are two overarching decisions needed: when is the first 
canvas completed and how many repetitions will make up the whole. Artist, Peter 
Dreher who painted the same empty glass over 5000 times, initially only intended to 
paint five or six so “people could understand what I meant”, and yet: “then I felt like 
doing another and another – and now there are 5,000” (Dreher & Spira, 2014, p. 19).
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Since 1974, Peter Dreher painted the same empty glass over 5000 times. Each painting 
25 x 20cm, the glass is centred on a neutral background.
That Dreher did not see them as a series, nor as one piece of work, but as thousands 
of individual paintings may explain the quantity. 
Each painting is a new event, a new moment, a new day, 
there is no repetition and no sense of an overall painting or artwork being complete. 
There is never a reason to move on to a new subject; individual paintings have been 
completed, but there is not a whole to work to - the next new painting is a straight-
sided cider glass sitting on a table. Everything is in a similar place (glass, table, 
canvas), yet the state of being, the act of painting is unique, and only in that moment. 
They may have a collective title, Tag um Tag guter Tag (Every Day is a Good Day) (1974-
2014), and have often been exhibited together, grid-like, in groups of various numbers, 
making it difficult not to see them as one painting, yet, from the artists point of view 
they are neither a series nor a whole, they remain individual.
The question as to how many repeats becomes somewhat simpler if the repeats are 
confined to the same canvas (something I have used in earlier paintings). The number 
of repeats is predetermined, the overall dimensions set. Even still, there is an option 
not to repeat and leave an area blank, something Pifferetti has occasionally resorted to, 
or to repeat the whole. 
In Pifferetti’s paintings the canvas is split in two, down the centre, with the same image 
‘repeated’ left and right. The centre mark, the split, is often a single line, that seemingly 
belongs to the whole; it is the only unrepeated mark. It halves the picture plane; the 
surface and the number of repetitions is immediately defined. 
The repeats are held within the confines of the canvas’s object quality, its ‘objectness’, 
its being, and there is no sense that another repeat exists, or ever could. The two 
inherently belong to one, their position as left and right fulfilling the whole. They are 
more obviously one painting, the individuality of the two separate halves becoming one 
image with repeated marks. Even when the repeat is unresolved (one half left blank), 
the canvas still defines the whole, the repeat is implied and the painting complete.
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In most of the Object Paintings, there is only one repeat (two canvases), in others 
there are four or six canvases. As the numbers increase it is initially the sameness 
that comes to the fore: there is strength in numbers as the canvases form a collective. 
The superficiality of the imagery binds them together, patterns emerge and there is a 
greater spectacle of fluctuating colour and brushstroke. There is no pre-set number 
of repetitions. Perhaps two parts are enough, the whole is complete and there is no 
inclination to produce more – the next painting is already in mind. On other occasions 
there feels a need to go further, to explore a greater number of repetitions, an increase 
in ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’, and ultimately to move away from binary comparisons. 
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Object 1, oil on canvas, 2 x (40 x 30cm), 
 
The figurine is photographed against a 
black background. Both canvasses were 
painted in the same day, one after another.
The painting consists of two canvases: 
the same image painted on each canvas. 
The two individual paintings are complete 
in their own right but form one piece 
of artwork. The first canvas is painted 
with direct reference to the figurine, or 
more particularly, a photograph of the 
figurine, the  second painting is painted 
from the first. Each canvas is 40cm x 
30cm, the image slightly larger than the 
original figurine. There is no reference 
to scale, other than our knowledge 
of the average size of such a figurine, 
designed for shelf or mantelpiece. 
Working from the photograph, the first 
painting starts loosely, the figure blocked 
in, the proportions and composition 
marked. The dark background, a 
reference to 17th Century Dutch Still Lifes 
(though equally a common photographic 
archival trait), is added. The background 
colour, a mixture of Burnt umber and 
Prussian blue, veers more to the umber, 
slightly warmer than the photograph. 
The same brush is used throughout 
the painting, brush marks differing in 
thickness through pressure, angle and 
adjacent strokes. Other than proportions, 
little truth to detail is preserved from the 
tightly painted original. Arms become 
single brush strokes, the dress a variety 
of flowing green marks, the under-dress a 
swirl of pink and white paint. The detail of 
the face is lost by the thickness of the brush 
and a downward slanting stroke serves 
as both eye and nose. An image may be 
read from these marks, though ultimately, 
they serve as abstract movements 
of paint whose reality lies in their 
substance and their relation to each other. 
The second canvas perhaps highlights 
this simultaneity. The painting is ‘copied’ 
from the first painting, further distancing 
itself from the original subject. Maintaining 
a freshness, a sense of energy and 
spontaneity is problematic, certainly 
initially. There is a sense of performance, 
a hesitancy and lack of freedom that 
the first painting possessed. A question 
over the ability to ‘repeat’ hangs heavy; 
there is a tension, a sense of fallibility. 
However, once the second painting is 
in process, the natural order of creating 
a painting takes over. Marks respond to 
marks, brushstrokes naturally follow one 
another and colours merge and mingle 
within their own confines. The aim being 
not to copy but to produce marks of 
equal quality. The slash of paint that 
describes the face in the first painting, 
becomes a slash of paint that mimics 
the first slash in the second painting. The 
dash of red, once giving notion  to the 
mouth of the figurine becomes another 
dash referring to the first. Although the 
marks are new and different, there are 
similarities and it is difficult not to be 
drawn into a game of ‘spot the difference’ 
as the eye wanders back and forth.
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The Act of Painting






Though subtle, the difference between the repeated image and 
the repeated painting appears to be more than semantics. Within 
the individual canvases of the Object paintings, as opposed to 
numerous repeats on a single canvas, there is a greater feeling 
of ‘a painting’ repeated. Like Dreher, standing in front of a new 
blank canvas, beginning a new event, I am in the same position, 
the dimensions and physicality of the canvas the same. There is a 
feeling of déjà vu. I am not moving along a row, shifting position, 
lifting the canvas to paint the bottom images. There is nothing 
adjacent to it, touching it, I cannot invade the next painting. I am 
held within its confines. There is autonomy in its existence and a 
greater sense of individuality. The collective is less assured and 
there is a vulnerability to the whole: that they could exist alone, 
that there could always be another, or that one could be taken 
away. They are less defined as a group, they are not ‘penned in’, 
their space and position changeable. Individually they have a 
substance, they are objects in themselves. 
Michel Foucault refers to Manet as one of the first artists to really 
understand the materiality and objectness of the canvas: “And 
Manet reinvents [or perhaps he invents] the picture-object, the 
picture as materiality, the picture as something coloured which 
clarifies an external light and in front of which, or about which, the 
viewer revolves” (Foucault, 2011, p. 31).
Not only acknowledging the painted surface, but also its being as 
an object that light shines upon and in front of which we stand. 
Whereas previously art had sought in some ways to deceive the 
viewer “to make the viewer forget, to try to mask and sidestep the 
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fact that painting was put down or inscribed on a certain fragment 
of space” (Foucault, 2011, p. 29), Manet, in his acceptance of the 
two-dimensional plane, highlights the three-dimensional quality of 
the ‘picture-object’:
Manet certainly did not invent non-representative painting 
because everything in Manet is representative, but he made 
a representational play of the fundamental material elements 
of the canvas. He was therefore inventing, if you like, the 
‘picture-object’, the ‘painting object’, and this no doubt was 
the fundamental condition so that finally one day we can get 
rid of representation itself and allow space to play with its pure 
and simple properties, its material properties (Foucault, 2011, 
p. 79).
Such ‘objectness’ is not defined by excessive substance, such as 
impasto paint or the thickness of the canvas, but by the very fact 
of its being, its ontological presence, its existence as a physical 
object, its existence as being a painting. While each canvas of 
the Object paintings is essentially traditional in its make-up: oil 
or acrylic on canvas, it is not a case of trying to make a painting 
a ‘thing’ but to recognise it as a thing. Its size, shape, or depth is 
irrelevant. It doesn’t need to be imposingly physical or sculptural, 
but essentially for the painting itself to contain the subject. To 
be a painting, rather than just a painting of something. As Gillian 
Carnegie said of her own paintings, “I prefer to consider the 




things in the world” (Wilson, 2013).  Important 
here is the word ‘prefer’, as it’s not quite as 
simple as something that is just willed.
This sense of honesty to materiality is certainly 
important in trying to understanding where the 
subject lies, but only through its inherence as a 
subject can the painting truly shed what Fried 
refers to as: “the relational character of almost 
all painting and the ubiquitousness, indeed the 
virtual inescapability, of pictorial illusion” (Fried, 
1998, p. 149).
In an ever-increasing image-based culture, 
painting may never “get rid of representation 
itself”, but it can still “play with its pure and 
simple properties” (Foucault, 2011, p. 79).
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In his essay Modernist Painting (1965) Clement Greenberg put great emphasis on the 
physicality and medium specificity of painting; stressing the need for purity, abolishing 
all that is external, both physically and aesthetically to painting itself. Essential to this 
was the acknowledgement of its materiality and the flatness of the picture plane itself:
One is made aware of the flatness of their pictures before, instead of after, being 
made aware of what the flatness contains. Whereas one tends to see what is in an 
Old Master before one sees the picture itself, one sees a Modernist picture as a 
picture first (Greenberg, 1965, p. 6).
Greenberg’s Modernism doesn’t necessarily call for the abandonment of 
representational imagery “in principle”, but rather: “What it has abandoned in 
principle is the representation of the kind of space that recognizable objects can 
inhabit” (Greenberg, 1965, p. 6). Fairly much one and the same thing, for even the 
hint of representation “The fragmentary silhouette of a human figure, or of a teacup” 
(Greenberg, 1965, p. 6) would serve as an allusion to a three-dimensional space. To 
maintain its autonomy, lest it got confused with sculpture, painting was to take on its 
Kantian self-criticism, and the answer was abstraction. 
Gilson, similarly keen on the materiality of the painting and the abolishment of the 
external, makes a distinction between ‘pictures’ and ‘painting’, where the ‘art of 
“picturing” – that is, doing pictures” is essentially to represent or imitate, and within 
which there is immediate pleasure in the recognition of faces or objects. It is directly 
reliant on the external reality it imitates, whereas: “A painting has its own rule, its 
own justification within itself … As it is, all judgments and appreciations of paintings 
founded upon their relation to an external model are irrelevant to painting” (Gilson, 
2020, p. 243).
In both Greenberg and Gilson, painting is treated as an independent entity. A closed 
shop, in which its materiality and medium specificity is its only subject. A dead-end 
street that led to Ad Reinhardt’s claim of his ‘black’ paintings, “I am merely making 
the last painting which anyone can make” (Kellein, 1985). Perhaps tongue in cheek, 
as Reinhardt continued to ‘repeat’ many versions of the same black painting, the only 
thing he had to say needed to be said again and again, “No object, no subject, no 
matter. No symbols, images, or signs” (Schwabsky, 2020, p34). 
Famously in opposition to Greenberg’s Modernist theory, critic Rosalind Krauss saw 
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such a drive for purity and “a definition of the medium as mere physical object, in all its 
reductiveness and drive toward reification” (Krauss, 2000, p. 6) as lacking in complexity, 
and that Greenberg’s “whole relationship to art was incredibly teleological” (Plante, 
2013).  Rather than raising the separate arts to one unifying notion of Art, Modernism 
had become: “the stupefying particularity of individual techniques, of everything that 
embeds practice in the tedium of its making: “Dumb like a painter,” they say” (Krauss, 
2000, p. 9). 
In aligning painting, or indeed, any art form solely to its substance, created an insularity 
that meant it could only ever be about itself:
The specific mediums - painting, sculpture, drawing - had vested their claims to 
purity in being autonomous, which is to say that in their declaration of being about 
nothing but their own essence, they were necessarily disengaged from everything 
outside their frames (Krauss, 2000, p. 11).
Krauss’s criticism is not so much of the medium itself, but how it was perceived as 
merely a physical substance. Paintings introspection and self-defining purity, placed 
solely on its being, was, in Krauss’s ‘post-medium condition’, pretty “Dumb”. Her 
call for artists to invent their own medium, was not that a new substance should be 
created, but that the medium should be used for a cause: “the specificity of mediums, 
even modernist ones, must be understood as differential, self-differing, and thus 
layering conventions never simply collapsed into the physicality of their support” 
(Krauss, 2000, p. 53).
If Modernism was too limiting and prescriptive, it nonetheless provided an extreme 
from which painting could proceed. In Krauss’s wish to erase the term ‘medium’, to 
“bury it like so much critical toxic waste, and walk away from it into a world of lexical 
freedom” (Krauss, 2000, p. 5), there are many terms within the notion of painting 
that equally seem too contaminated. When talking of ‘objectness’, ‘materiality’, or 
‘picture-object’, such terms should be seen in their contemporary context as well 
as their historical origins. Within this, even the term ‘Painting’ becomes somewhat 
anachronistic. Contemporary painting can be made of, or, in any medium, and in any 
conceivable way. It is not specific, and yet comes within a label that is. As artist Joseph 
Kosuth famously wrote: 
Being an artist now means to question the nature of art. If one is questioning the 
nature of painting, one cannot be questioning the nature of art. If an artist accepts 
painting (or sculpture) he is accepting the tradition that goes with it. That’s because 
the word art is general and the word painting is specific (Kosuth, 1991, p. 18).






The Object paintings are made of paint on a canvas and wood substrate, they are 
undoubtedly paintings, and they are objects; they sit in a ‘post-medium condition’. 
Such contradictions are central to their making. 
they are made of paint 
they are paintings 
they are paintings of paintings 
they use paint
they are not paint 
they are painting 
the act of painting 
the painting is painting
painting is an action
painting is an experience
painting is a memory
the paintings are not paint
the paintings are painting
 the paintings are paintings of painting itself painting
A painting need not be made of paint, but a painting can be made of paint. As Isabelle 
Graw writes, “Once the medium can no longer be delimited, then no qualities can be 
inherent to it. Its character, rather, depends on how the artist will proceed with it” (Graw 
et al, 2012, p. 48). 
It may no longer be medium-specific, and though ‘Painting’ as a term may have 
expanded into different forms and refer to a variety of mediums - at which maybe it 
should be considered as just ‘art’ -  it does not preclude the use of paint. Within this 
expanded notion, paint is not the only medium of expression, but it is one of them, and 
with it comes all its historical context, and its familiarity. Paintings’ path, like all art, is 
not a linear timeline, “It develops by going backward, sideways, around, in, and over – 
and, yes, sometimes, but only sometimes, by going forward” (Schwabsky, 2019, p. x).
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That as a culture we have moved from Modernism, to Postmodernism or 
Altermodernism, it is not that previous practices should be dismissed, but that we are 
forced to consider them in a different light; as artist and audience, we are a product 
of our times. To understand our own context as present, we need to look to the past 
and equally to the future, “today’s painting is not necessarily more conscious than 
modernist painting, but it is conscious of different things” (Schwabsky, 2019, p. 8). 
Painting has moved away from “self referentiality to self-reflexivity” (Graw et al, 2012, 
p. 11), to move within its societal context and not above or as a separate entity. 
Painting today may take on many forms and influences, but by virtue of its title 
“Painting” and all its reference, can only really succeed “by coming to terms with its 
own gratuitousness” (Schwabsky, 2019, p. 257). It doesn’t solve any problems, but 
essentially aware of its context, can question and play within its own being, “They are 






Contemporary painting is not so concerned with being a vehicle to represent an image, 
but that the image becomes a way to represent ‘the painting’s idea of painting’: 
That is one reason there is so little contradiction now between abstract and 
representational painting: in both cases, the painting is not there to represent the 
image; the image exists to represent the painting (that is, the painting’s idea of 
painting) (Schwabsky, 2019, p. 10).
The painting, the ‘picture-object’, very much the subject, yet accepting it as purely 
autonomous is another matter. There may be ‘little contradiction’ between abstraction 
and representation, but there will always be questions as to what it is ‘a painting of’, 
rather than it just being seen as ‘a painting’; a tendency to look outside of the painting, 
and not within. It is a “virtual inescapability” (Fried, 1998, p. 149), one where notions 
of ‘representational’ or ‘abstract’ are hard to ignore, but of equal irrelevance. Abstract 
painting is often regarded as painting that is most essentially about itself, but either 
can refer to an outside source. They are interchangeable. ‘Abstract’ painting is no less 
about nothing than ‘representation’ is about something. Both serve as labels imploring 
the viewer to look externally for the subject. 
If both use paint, colour and brushstrokes, there is little physical distinction between 
them. In terms of the ‘materiality’ they are the same, and as such, in terms of the 
‘picture-object’, they are also the same. Both may refer to an external source as the 
subject, yet equally, the subject may also be inherent in both. That we see a glass in 
Dreher’s paintings is no different, subjectively, to the imagery that we may imagine 
in Pifferetti’s. Any visual difference between the artists’ work comes down to the 
arrangement of the paint on the surface of the canvas. As Maurice Denis is often 
quoted from his article, Définition du néo-traditionnisme (1890):
It is well to remember that a picture - before being a battle horse, a nude woman, or 
some anecdote - is essentially a plane surface covered with colors assembled in a 
certain order (Krauss, 2000, p. 6).
Not just its materiality or flatness, but as Krauss refers to in difference to Greenberg: 
he is instead describing the layered, complex relationship that we could call a 
recursive structure – a structure, that is, some of the elements of which will produce 
the rules that generate the structure itself (Krauss, 2000, p. 6).
The materiality of the paint and the representation are not mutually exclusive; the 
marks of paint are the representation. It is a combination of these marks, and their 
configuration, that result in what we call ‘representational’, or, a combination of these 
marks, in a different position ‘abstract’. Not only does our brain recognise these marks 
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as having some kind of equivalent in a natural world, but such recognition can also 
trigger a neurological response similar to seeing the original of what is represented. 
According to a study published in Social Neuroscience, we now react to emoticons as 
real faces ‘ :-) ‘. It is thought that the ‘emoticon’ originated around 1982, and that prior 
to this a semicolon, dash, bracket would not have produced such recognition. Dr Owen 
Churches described it as “an entirely culturally-created neural response” (Hudson, 
2014).
Furthermore, the research found that whilst this combination, in this order: 
 :-)  
activated such a response, when reversed: 
(-: 
this was not so. The marks are the same, just a different configuration.
 
Whether innate or learned, such powerful processes of recognition are difficult 
to ignore or unlearn. It is perhaps just easier for the viewer to readily accept 
representational painting. There is something for the viewer to recognise, the ‘what is 
it?’ is immediately satiated. 
However, there is little difference between them within the actuality of the painting. 
Dreher doesn’t set out to paint an illusion of a glass, but “simply sets down islands of 
colour next to each other” and, “Thus, an abstract painting has come into being, in 
which one can also see a glass” (Dreher & Spira, 2014, p. 108).
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In an interview in 2013, Carnegie told journalist Simon Grant, “What my drawings 
depict doesn’t concern me as much as drawing them. I’m just not concerned with 
knowing about, say, what images tell us. That cat, those stairs, these flowers, this 
or that tree is really just a support for drawing itself” (Wroe & Grant, 2013).
Schwabsky takes up on this is a chapter from his book Gillian Carnegie (2020); the 
title of the chapter taken from Carnegie’s own words ‘What Images Tell Us’: 
But surely it’s a paradox, painting cats and trees and the rest while asking the 
beholder not to think too much about cats and trees? (Schwabsky, 2020, p.33).
Written about Carnegie’s paintings, such a paradox is equally at the heart of trying 
to understand the status of the image, the original subject, within the Object 
paintings. Back to Matisse and Magritte, is this paradox only relevant to the 
painting in its singularity, or does it remain within the multiple? Can one paradox 
be cancelled by another, that is if we add repetition.   
While not repetitions as such, although she does ‘copy’ or ‘repeat’ smaller 
paintings to make larger ones, Carnegie’s paintings often return to the same 
motifs: trees, staircases, dried flowers and cats.
Within each category the motifs are often painted differently, but unlike Dreher’s 
glass that responds to differing light reflections, Carnegie’s paintings seemingly 
ignore any particularity to the moment and its effect on the object. There is a 
distance and deflection away from any singular verisimilitude, yet, at the same 
time there is a surface realism to many of her paintings that leads to a definite 
recognition of the objects by the viewer, and that far from being generic by 
category, as: tree, cat, flower, they are specifically: that tree, “that black cat, these 
dried flowers” (Schwabsky, 2020, p.37). What species, breed or truth to reality is 
inconclusive: “I think I can see that it is the same black cat each time, that (at least 
until she later starts painting a white cat — or painting a cat white) she always 
paints that cat, whatever its name is” (Schwabsky, 2020, p.37).
The cat may change colour but it is still the same cat. The same flowers in a 
cut off water bottle, the same tree, yet, they all reappear in different guises from 
painting to painting. 
This cat that I always recognize as the same one is nonetheless no cat in 
particular, the flowers no flowers in particular, in the sense that there is no 
evident significance attached to the fact that it is this cat and not another, 
those flowers and not others. Their specificity is allied to something generic 
(Schwabsky, 2020, p.37).
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They may have no particularity to reality, but they do to themselves, and it is seemingly 
in the repetition or appropriation that the specificity lies. As in the objects of the Object 
paintings, Dreher’s glass or Edefalk’s figures there is a familiarity that comes from 
within the repeat. Any truth to the original becomes increasingly lost, as each time the 
cat appears its specificity is to its previous and equally to its next appearance. 
In Edefalk’s painting Echo (1992-94), a series of twelve self-portraits, we see a three-
quarter profile of a woman. The first is painted from a photograph, the second from 
the first, the third from the second, and so on. It could be Edefalk, it could be anybody. 
The paintings are of differing sizes, some mirror each other, others are hung upside-
down and one appears to have been erased. In the singular we may search for external 
likeness, but as a collective we are forced engage within the work. Each painting 
speaks to and of the other, forcing the viewer around the room, consumed by the 
confines of an “autonomous entity” (Edefalk, 1999, p. 53).
  
There is a woman and there is another one, 
there are likenesses, but they are different. 
When you look at my self-portraits, it seems like you always are seeing the same 
figure. If you look carefully, however, you will notice that they are painted very 
differently, and that each bears a different expression (Edefalk, 1999, p. 53).
The first painting is a painting of a photograph of Cecilia Edefalk; the subject already 
reproduced. The second is a painting of the first painting. The image of a woman still 
remains, but it is not a painting of Cecilia Edefalk. It is a painting of a painting that 
is a painting of a photograph of Cecilia Edefalk. The only truth to reality is that it is a 
painting by Cecilia Edefalk. 
We are forced away from the original subject towards the collective values of the 
twelve paintings, the sameness, and ultimately to the individual qualities of each 
painting distinguished by differences. As the reliance on an external reference recedes 
the individual parts take on greater significance, increased individuality and towards a 
Jungian sense of individuation:
the process by which individual beings are formed and differentiated; in particular, 
it is the development of the psychological individual as a being distinct from the 
general, collective psychology. Individuation, therefore, is a process of differentiation, 
having for its goal the development of the individual personality (Jung, 2017, p. 411).
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As each subsequent painting questions the validity of the previous, rather than 
devaluing the unique, it serves to intensify it. The repetition, in Edefalk’s words, “a way 
to underline the uniqueness of a painting” (Edefalk, 1999, p. 53). The image may be 
devalued through proliferation, but not the individual canvases; within the ‘repeats’ the 
image is generic, the paintings are specific. Any importance placed on the likeness to 
Cecilia Edefalk, is finally abolished, and with it, any misplaced definitive, unveiling an 
ever-changing form that speaks of life itself. The paintings may well be a ‘self-portrait’, 
but they have little to do with likeness to appearance. As Daniel Birnbaum points out in 
his essay ‘Angelic, Demonic: On Cecilia Edefalk’:
The personal appears not in the form of a confident assertion of a unique self, but 
rather in those marginal, sometimes hardly detectable deviations which produce 
difference in repetitions (Edefalk, 1999, p. 52).
In Edefalk’s Another Movement (1990), seven paintings of differing sizes, the original 
image is taken from a magazine advert for sun cream. The cream absent, we see a 
man touching the back of a woman sitting in the sun. We don’t know the characters, 
nor the story and in the singular it is an anonymous, ubiquitous advertising image. Yet, 
the longer we spend with the paintings and the more we become involved, the slight 
changes within the repetitions offer both familiarity and individualisation. 
In the first painting the imagery may have specificity to the original subject, though 
essentially is a work of fiction, as any truth to reality is dispelled in its translation to a 
painting. Through repetition the external specificity is lost, and the image becomes 
generic. Its specificity is only to itself, within the repeats and the painting as a whole. 
As Pifferetti said of his own repetition:
The painting will, in the end, never represent anything. It will present painting, 
representing itself in its intimacy and its difference (Fyfe, 2006).
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In her desire to differentiate the imagery from the painting, Carnegie describes her own 
work “as filling the space with miniature abstractions as I don’t imagine my paintings 
as a surface made from images” (Schwabsky, 2020, p. 115). As Michael Archer points 
out, even in his most photorealistic paintings, Malcolm Morely’s concerns when 
painting, were not of an overall illusion, but of a small area he has masked off, limiting 
his concerns to only that of colour and not to what his marks might represent (Dreher & 
Spira, 2014, p. 16). Morley himself states:
So, each section receives the same attention, has the same value and you get away 
from the idea of foreground and background (Wroe, 2013). 
 
Morley is clearly dealing with an idea of ‘pure’ painting, only on a more microscopic 
level. However, without the knowledge of Morely’s methods, this may remain 
undetected by the viewer, and brings into question whether scale is an important 
factor in understanding the subject of the painting. Photorealistic painting is by nature 
illusionistic but fundamentally its make-up is no different to any large-scale abstract 
painting. The size of brush mark or thickness of paint, while relative to the size of 
the painting, should not necessarily define its intention. How small the brushstrokes, 
or how well they are hidden, are not criteria to judge their existence. Morley talks of 
the “physical reality of the surface” (Wroe, 2013), and although his intentions are to 
create an illusion, a representation of a photograph, he is fundamentally making a 
painting that understands its own reality. He is trying to make a painting that looks 
like a photograph, but he is not trying to deceive us that it is a photograph. As he 
appreciated in Velasquez:
When you look at Velásquez, they look like [globs] that he’s flicked on the canvas, 
and you stand back, it’s this astonishing diamond (McDermott, 2015).
Perhaps it comes down to the obviousness of the ‘globs’, and what we experience as 
the viewer. The loose ‘globs’ of Velasquez can be observed close-up, but mostly we 
just see a ‘diamond’. So, in order to appreciate the ‘globs’ and see beyond the purely 
representational, do we need to zoom in? To make the ‘globs’ bigger, of greater scale, 
or do we just need to look more closely. Cecilia Edefalk offers her own solution: “I want 
to keep alive a certain vulnerability that functions both as integrity and openness, and 
lets the viewer enter into the painting. I seek to achieve a kind of clumsiness, in order 
to enhance the brushstroke” (Edefalk, 1999, p. 55).
Carnegie seeks a similar openness, but through different means, describing how 
“separating the image from the marks that make it engages a complex relationship 
between observation and experience”, at which Schwabsky reasons, “so that as 
viewers we engage with how the image is painted more than with what the image is” 
(Schwabsky, 2020, p. 51).
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Within two of the Object paintings, Object 10 and Object 16, there is a change of 
scale, with the latter four times the size. The brush strokes are broader and more 
obvious, the marks less frequent and the colour more muted. There is a greater sense 
of ‘clumsiness’, and yes, to stand in front of it, there is, perhaps, an easier route for the 
viewer. It is in many ways a simpler painting. Yet, the image of the figurine remains, and 
much like reading the emoticon, while flatter and less defined it is at the same time just 
as obvious.
The imagery is more generic, less particular to the original object, but more particular 
to itself. It is no particular ‘dog-in-bag’, but it is that ‘dog-in-bag’. There is a greater 
play between the painted mark, as independent as just a brushstroke and collectively 
within the imagery it apparently depicts. A play that creates a tension, a push and 
pull, between the painting and the picture. The ‘picture-object’ seemingly intact, 
yet so is the image. As Schwabsky writes of Carnegie, her “work does not promote 
form or technique over subject, but instead pursues the rigor of form and technique 
precisely to better catch sight of the point of non-contact between form and subject” 
(Schwabsky, 2020, p. 51).
All painting needs some point of departure. Painter Cecily Brown sees the subject as 
“something to hang the paint on” (Bech Dyg, 2014), for Carnegie it is “just a support 
for the painting itself, a means to an end” (Schwabsky, 2020, p. 51). Like Morely and 
Dreher, there is an apparent need to distance themselves from the image or object in 
order to solely concentrate on the act of painting. The supposed constraints set by 
the original subject, allowing for greater freedom (rather than less), and ultimately, to a 
more concentrated act of painting. As Dreher describes, an “ego-less state ... almost 








In Dreher’s Tag um Tag guter Tag (1974-2014), the paintings are never 
repeated. What he repeats is a situation. Each painting is a new response to 
the still life. The light is different, as are reflections and background colours. 
Some are painted at night, some in daylight. They are unique responses to a 
unique situation. The paintings are individual, but there is a ‘sameness’ that 
draws them together, in: size, composition, brush mark and the same use of 
muted colours. There is no hint of duplication, rather, an honest repeated act 
devoid of artifice. 
In Piffaretti, Edefalk, and indeed the Object paintings, this is a different 
matter. The ‘repeats’ are of an image or painting. While, never faithful copies, 
the initial image is mimicked in the ‘repeat’. The first painting is fresh and 
impulsive, the second, systematically methodical and deliberate. The original 
painting is original, the next an original response to the first. They are both 
individual but wholly dependent on each other. Is one art the other artifice, or 
are both equally authentic? Whether made in sequence or simultaneously, in 
either case, there is a series of repeated marks that question the original.
When Rauschenberg made Factum I and Factum II (1957), he did so, as 
Robert Hughes suggests: “to refute the myth of abstract expressionist 
spontaneity, on which the special authenticity of the painting was thought to 
depend” (Hughes, 2006). He goes on to describes the elements of  photo-
collage and typography as identical in both pictures, and whilst this is 
debatable, he points to the “accidental” drip and “casual” smudge of the 
paint as “not precisely identical…they are only similar, but that is enough” 
and that:
In the very act of mimicking the heat of the creative moment, they give a 
perfect and ruthless critique of the very notion of accident (Hughes, 2006).
It is not only the repeat that is questioned but also the original and as 
Pifferetti put it, (Fyfe, 2006) 
“It is already the memory 
of what will be produced on 
the other half of the canvas.”
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Had Dreher painted only one glass, it may be difficult to move away from the 
illusionistic quality of the painting. It is hard not to see the first painting as anything 
other than representational. We see a glass, reflections and all, sitting on a table. Yet, 
he always intended to paint another, up to five or six. He is already anticipating the 
next, and in doing so is already referring to the painting as the subject and not the 
glass:
I was always cautious about narrative pictures charged with meaning. But an 
individual painting loses its relationship with reality as soon as it is repeated. It is just 
a painting (Dreher & Spira, 2014, p.19).
Similarly, for Pifferetti :
The simple act of redoing almost identically everything (every think) that was painted 
the first time around has the effect of cutting off any subjective effects due to the 
painting’s form, style or color, so that it is now just painting (Fyfe, 2006).
Within both artists work 
is the importance of the doing, 
the action of the repeat; 
the painting or paintings 
the result of the action made visible, 
the process essentially the subject.
As in the Object paintings, they are not concerned with the proliferation of images but 
rather with of a repeated process of experience. 
We wash, dress go to work, seemingly repetitive actions. We do so readily the next 
day, we revisit the same place, we do the same things, but they are always different. 
We take a break from the monotony at the weekend, and then we go again. Our 
weekly experiences of sameness are not isolated incidents but an accumulation. 
We learn from them and become grounded through the comparative differences. 
In our own Sisyphean world, it is the very ‘repetition’ that keeps us going:
This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile. 
Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled mountain, in itself, 
forms a world. The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart. 
One must imagine Sisyphus happy (Camus, 2005, p. 119 ).
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What we see in the numerous paintings of Dreher, is not the glass, but his own daily 
routine. The activity his ‘time and place point’, the painting, the ‘thing’, a document 
of his unique experience: ““What is a thing?” A thing is always a this one (je dieses)” 
(Heidegger, 1967, p.18). The subject lies in the act of painting, the moment is ‘his’ 
reality. It is not just in the substance of the paint, or the materiality of the canvas, but 
within the process; the action of the ‘repeat’ in some ways more important than the 
result. The paintings possess what Isabelle Graw describes as ‘the value of liveliness’. 
Not an ‘aesthetic’ liveliness, but:
Rather, the sense of liveliness we get from painting results from the fact that life and 
work time of the respective artists have been spent on it (Birnbaum & Graw, p. 81).
And not just the ‘living labour’ required to make the painting, but more so, “the labor 
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Transitivity is as old as the hills. It is a tangible property of the artwork. Without it, 
the work is nothing other than a dead object, crushed by contemplation (Bourriaud, 
2002, p. 26).
The painting may exist in its ontological state as an object, but without any interaction 
it remains just that, an object. In order for the agency of the artist to be conveyed, a 
viewer or recipient is needed and essentially a phenomenological approach. All art 
requires some level of interaction, and it’s not to say that the repeated paintings need 
a higher degree of interaction, but it does need to be active. As Isabelle Graw refers to 
the “quasi-person” (Graw et al, 2012, p. 54), or Alfred Gell in Art and Agency, that “the 
immediate ‘other’ in a social relationship does not have to be another ‘human being’” 
(Gell, 1998, p. 17), the interactivity between the viewer and the repeated paintings 
bears a closer resemblance to that of the relation art:
If a work of art is successful, it will invariably set its sights beyond its mere presence 
in space: it will be open to dialogue, discussion, and that form of inter-human 
negotiation that Marcel Duchamp called “the coefficient of art”, which is a temporal 
process, being played out here and now (Bourriaud, 2002, p. 41).
Cecilia Edefalk approaches the hanging of her exhibitions very much as an installation. 
Whether the ‘white cube’ created for her show at the XXII Bienal de Sao Paulo, or the 
more directly connected response to the space of the Kunsthalle Bern gallery, her 
repeated works create an autonomy that we need not look outside of. As observed by 
Bernhard Fibicher in an interview with the artist: 
An object that you can approach from all sides, that forces you to circle it and to 
concentrate your attention on it, is an autonomous entity with its own laws (Edefalk, 
1999, p. 53). 
In the singular this may be a largely static activity, within the repeats the viewer is part 
of the action. Actively involved in the process of the repetition, the memory and the
accumulated experience. 
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Rauschenberg’s Factum I and Factum II now exist in separate locations, one in the 
Museum of Modern Art in New York, the other to the Museum of Contemporary Art in 
Los Angeles, and as such begs the question whether the repetitions need to be seen 
together. 
This is not a question we need apply to Pifferetti, where the repeats are confined to 
one canvas, but in say Dreher, Edefalk or the Object paintings, how they are hung, in 
relation to each other, comes into greater importance. Are they hung side by side, close 
by each other, or further apart? One above the other, in separate rooms, or in the case 
of Edefalk, which way up or at which angle. These are all variables that change how 
the works are experienced. Side by side becomes a quickfire movement of the eye, 
switching from one canvas to the other. Some cultures read left to right, others right to 
left, some vertically. Placing one painting above another, alters our eye movement and 
for some may be less intuitive than a sideways movement. Hung further apart, opposite 
or in different rooms, we are forced to rely on memory and there is a greater distance to 
travel back to the next or previous. 
There is a difference in time. 
Our experience is slowed, 
or equally our movement may be quickened 
to counteract the uncertainty of memory. 
In the extreme, Rauschenberg’s Factum I and Factum II are together, that is, if we travel 
back and forth from New York to Los Angeles, merely placing greater significance on 
time and memory.
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In an increasingly digital or virtual world, there is an inevitability that many works of art 
will only ever be viewed, by the majority, as reproductions. As David Joselit explains, in 
a move away from ‘Cezanne’s doubt’ towards what he refers to as ‘Duchamp’s doubt’: 
The question has become, not where to deposit a quantum of paint on its 
support, but rather, where will the painting—or the image—go. How will it behave? 
Duchamp’s doubt begins when the work enters the world (Graw et al, 2016, p. 17).
Photography and mass-produced images have brought an egalitarianism to art. The 
viewer has instant access, and as Berger points out: “the painting now travels to the 
spectator rather than the spectator to the painting” (Berger, 2008, p. 20). Yet, as it 
does so its context is continually altered, and is “submitted to infinite dislocations, 
fragmentations, and degradations” (Joselit, 2009, p.134). 
As with the translation from the original object, to a photograph, and to a painting, the 
translation of the painting to a photograph, is again, a translation to another thing. In 
some ways the Object paintings have come full circle: painted from a photograph, a 
reproduction, of a reproduction of an object, they are now viewed as photographs, a 
reproduction, of a reproduction of an object. 
The new status of the original work is the perfectly rational consequence of the new 
means of reproduction (Berger, 2008, p. 21). 
It is inevitably, it is how the Object paintings are exhibited within this virtual gallery, 
and as Andre Rottmann describes, the media of reproduction and distribution of the 
paintings, are: “the very circuits and trajectories of dissemination and validation” (Graw 
et al, 2016, p. 10).
It is how they will predominately be received. It is how I have viewed and responded 
to the paintings of Dreher, Pifferetti, Edefalk, Packer, Bernhardt and to some extent 
Carnegie. It does not prevent a relational interaction with the paintings, but it is a 
different relationship, or in the case of Carnegie’s paintings (which I have seen in 
person) an additional relationship. 
Seen in reproduction, as Morely said of his own photo-realistic painting: “it does look 
like a photograph, but when you see the physical reality of the surface it seems to 
work on you through your central nervous system” (Wroe, 2013). In reproduction, his 
painting looks like a photograph. A photographic reproduction of a painting that was 
painted to give the illusion of a photograph. The viewer is not looking at the painting, 
but a facsimile. It is difficult to respond to it emotively, there is no scale or sense of 
materiality, our ‘central nervous system’ untouched. It is now an image, albeit initially, a 
specific image, within a network of ever-increasing images.
A network, within which the paintings are transitive, “defined by their circulation from 
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place to place and their subsequent translation into new contexts” (Joselit, 2009, p. 
128). 
Within the Object paintings, a specific painting translates to a specific image of a 
painting, within which there is a generic image of an object that is specific to that 
specific painting. 
If that specific image is reproduced to represent a painting, it becomes a generic image 







































































































It is no longer the painting, that thing, but it is a thing, and there is an image in it.
It is all about context
And essentially, understanding the context in which the image of the painting is 
situated. The painting itself is nothing on its own but an object. It is reliant on “the 
social-relational matrix in which it is embedded. It has no ‘intrinsic’ nature, independent 
of the relational context” (Gell, 1998, p. 7), and if that context is the media of 
reproduction and distribution of the painting, then that is the context of its relational 
interaction.
How well a painting fairs will be dependent on “its capacity to hold in suspension the 
passages internal to a canvas, and those external to it” (Joselit, 2009, p. 129). The 
Object paintings may have distanced themselves from external subjectivity but they 
cannot exist as self-contained entities. Translated to another thing, the image of the 
painting exists simultaneously with the painting, in Joselit’s words, “Painting is beside 
itself” (Joselit, 2009, p. 134).
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i n ·  d i ·  v i d ·  u ·  a ·  t i o n
Individuation, repetition, repetition, repetition, process. “The process 
by which individual beings are formed and differentiated…..a process 
of differentiation.”[1] Group, mass, culture, populism, fascism, the 
fear of difference, democracy. The people, the people have spoken. 
Gleichschaltung! Gleichschaltung! Standardisation, assimilation, difference. 
“You don’t need to follow me. You don’t need to follow anybody! You’ve got 
to think for yourselves. You’re all individuals!”[2] Majority, mass production, 
consumerism. “Yes, we’re all individuals!”[2] Flock, herd, instinct, mentality. 
To paint it. Destroy it.…“this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-
creating, the eternally self-destroying.”[3] Isolation. Idealism. Art. Temporality. 
Object. Singularity. Death of God. Repetition: “there is no repetition….. 
reality is only in the moment.”[4] Real, fake, copy, reproduction. Collective 
conscience. Repeat. Paradox. Repetition cannot exist without difference. 
There is no signifier of difference without repetition. No two things can ever 
be the same. “The conclusions that we seek to draw from the likeness of 
events are unreliable, because events are always unlike.”[5] They are the 
same. Isolation. Evaluation. Figurine. Grotesque idealism. Colour, form, 
composition. Timescale. Scale. Replica. The danger of the precedent. 
Duplication. Value, devalue, original - “that which is repeated has been.”[6] 
Memory. Appropriation of the artist by the artist. Process. Picture. Image. 
Abstraction. “Subjectivity has already been strangled.”[7] Dematerialisation. 
Copy, mimic. It is a cat. We see a cat. The original is a cat. The repeat 
is a cat. It is not a cat. It is a painting. It is a painting of a painting. They 
are the same. They are different - “a perfect and ruthless critique of the 
very notion of accident.”[8] The cat is dead. The cat is alive. The mouse is 
now dead. It is now the subject of the second, which in itself is a painting 
of the first. Imagery. Superficiality. They are all a cat and they are not a 
cat. Simultaneity. Object. Subject. Death of the object through the object. 
“God is dead, but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands 
of years in which his shadow will be shown.”[9] Infinity. Eternal recurrence. 
Repeat. Exist. Original. It is inextricably linked. Principium individuationis.
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1 (Jung, 2017, p. 411).
2 (Jones & Goldstone, 1979).
3 (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 550).
4 (Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 275)
5 (Montaigne, 1993, p. 344).
6 (Kierkegaard, 1983, p. 149).
7 (Fyfe, 2006).
8 (Hughes, 2006).
9 (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 167).
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Conclusion
When Bartleby repeats, ‘I would prefer not to’, he cuts himself off from any normal 
relationship with his work, the subject of his employment. He doesn’t refuse to work, 
but nor does he. In a similar way, the repetition within the Object paintings shifts the 
emphasis away from the original subject. The paintings now exist in relation, and 
indeed reliance to each other, all subjectivity effectively abandoned. 
This was outlined at the beginning of this study, and was very much a straight-
forward all-consuming ideal from the outset of the research: the paintings were 
no longer paintings of the original figurine, that was now dead, the paintings are 
paintings of themselves, solely concerned with the unique quality of experience and 
the impossibility of repetition. The image a by-product of the painting. Oh, were it so 
simple! The problem was the image, it just never went away. As Nietzsche wrote in The 
Gay Science (1882):
God is dead, but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of 
years in which his shadow will be shown (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 167).
And it is in these shadows that the image remains. The object (the singularity) is no 
longer the subject of the painting, ‘God is Dead’, but the superficiality of the image 
remains. There may be little truth to the original object, translated to another thing, a 
painting, it is a work of fiction. It is, essentially, a generic image, its only specificity is 
to itself within the repeats -  but it exists, and with that goes every external cultural 
reference. 
As the painting itself is translated to an image and moves with the networks of 
reproduction and communication, its context continually altered, the imagery comes 
under further scrutiny and cannot be ignored. The cheap and mundane equal to 
anything within Reynolds hierarchy?. The everyday objects that speak of our existence, 
memorium and profligacy; our own lives reflected back at us, or, just everyday tat? The 
image relies on context, “How will it behave?” (Graw et al, 2016, p. 17), the continuing 
doubt. In a culture awash with images there is an image of a cat. Which particular cat is 
irrelevant; it is an image of a cat, and that is enough.   
That the image can exist and simultaneously be absent as the subject, is, just one of 
a number of paradoxes evident within the Object paintings: repetitions of a painting of 
an object in which neither repetition nor the object exist; made of paint, but not about 
paint; simultaneously representational and abstract; an object and an image. 
Apparent contradictions to which there are no definitive answers, only suggestions: 
repetition is not a reality; the painting of a thing is a translation to another thing; there 
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is no Greenbergian purity; they are about painting, the experience of painting, an 
act; notions of representation and abstraction are effectively irrelevant, cut off by the 
repeat, the image is a representation of the painting; they are dependent on context 
and affected by differing modes of communication and reproduction.
And it is in celebration of such contradictions and paradoxes that the Object paintings 
stand. They question painting. They question themselves. They are gratuitous. 
As Schwabsky wrote of Carnegie’s paintings, “The multiplication of different repetitions 
of the same shows the artist’s fascination with representing, her pleasure in doing it, 
and the impossibility of its ever being the truth” (Schwabsky, 2020, p. 122).
They are all a cat and they are not a cat
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